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COMMENTS
FEDERAL POLICE PowER TURNS TO THE POSTAL CLAUSE.-During the past
three years the federal government in an attempt to cope with pressing national
problems, has invaded strange fields regarded by many as solely within the
domain of state jurisdiction. The result has been a spirited legal struggle,
still in the course of vigorous prosecution, between the jealous guardians of
states' rights and the enthusiastic proponents of greater federal power. Rally-
ing beneath the standard of the Tenth Amendment the adherents of the doctrine
made sacred by Calhoun have valiantly fought to dam the ever-rising tide of
national police power. Under the aegis of popular support, the federal forces
have wheeled into action the heavy artillery of -the taxation clause, the gen-
eral welfare clause, the interstate commerce clause, and the postal clause.1 It
is to a determination of the range and striking power of the last mentioned
field-piece that this paper is directed.
The Constitution vests in Congress the power "to establish post-offices and
post-roads."'2 Apprehensive lest too strong an expression of federal power
jeopardize the acceptance of the proposed constitution, the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention phrased the grant in its present innocuous form.)
But passing mention was made of it in the FederastA and the state conven-
tions were almost unanimous in considering the clause too innocent to warrant
discussion.5 With the passage of time, however, this merest skeleton of a
grant has been enveloped with the flesh and blood of a vast postal system.0
1. For a general discussion of national police power see Cushman's articles, National
Police Power Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (1919) 3 MIN. L. Rzv. 289,
381, 452; National Police Power Under the Taxation Clause of the Constitution (1920)
4 M NN. L. REv. 247; National Police Power Under the Postal Clause of the Constitution
id. at 402. The spending power is discussed in CORWIN, TnE TWILI0HT OF Tr. SuxaRzrMx
COURT (1934) c. 4. See also The Gold Clause Cases, 294 U. S. 240 (1935), Comment (1935)
4 FoRDHA I L. REv. 287; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935) (Hot Oil
case), (1935) 4 FORDHA.r L. Rxv. 341; A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U. S. 495 (NRA case) (1935), Comment (1935) 4 FoRDHtAm L. Rv. 457; Railroad Retire-
ment Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330 (1935), (1935) 4 FoRDn=. L. Rzv. 498;
United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936) (AAA case) ; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 56 Sup. Ct. 466 (1936), Comment (1936) 5 FoRDHAX L. Rzv. 114.
2. U. S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 7.
3. ROoERS, POSTAL PowER OF CONoRESS (1916) 23.
4. "The power of establishing post-roads must, in every view, be a harmless power; and
may perhaps, by judicious management become productive of great public convenlency.
Nothing which tends to facilitate the intercourse between the states can be deemed un-
worthy of the public care." FEDRzLISr (1788) No. 42.
5. ROOES, POSTAl. POwER OF CONGRESS (1916) 25. In New York alone was danger per-
ceived in the grant. At the state convention Mr. Jones moved an amendment which would
limit the postal clause so that Congress could not effect construction or repair of highways
in a state without that state's consent. 2 ELLIorr's DEBATES 379.
6. The postal system has grown to enormous size. See POSTAL STAiSics ox nE UNITn
STATES FROm 1789 TO 1930, By FiscAL YEARS (U. S. Post Office Dep't); Cuu, TnE POST
OmcE oF THE UNTEaD STATES (2d ed. 1932).
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Carriage of the mails was early made a government monopoly. Later
postal service was broadened to include the issuance of money orders,8 the
banking facilities of a postal savings bank,9 and the common carrier function
of the parcel post.'0 In addition, the system, with its extensive network of
post-offices reaching every sizable community in the country, has become one
of the most valuable administrative organizations in the employ of the federal
government. For example, it has been called upon to collect taxes by the
sale of stamps"l and to borrow money by the sale of bonds.'- Aside from
the administrative activities, what has been outlined above constitutes the
collectivistic functions of the post-office.' 3 Naturally the government's in-
cursions into the field of private business have not escaped vehement criticism.' 4
But the postal system is more than a mere competitor of private business.
It advances the public good by providing an instrumentality dedicated to the
ideal of the cheap and efficient transmission of intelligence.1 5 Further, it
forms the background for the exercise of an indispensable national police power.
Congress May Establish Post-roads
Under the plenary grant of power to establish post-roads Congress possesses
7. 1 STAT. 232 (1792). The modem statute is 35 STAr. 1123 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. § 304
(1926). The monopoly is constitutional. United States v. Bromley, 53 U. S. 81 (1851);
United States v. Thompson, Fed. Cas. No. 16,489 (D. Afass. 1846) ; see Ex partc Jactson,
96 U. S. 727, 735 (1877). For an early contention that the monopoly is unconstitutional
see a pamphet entitled "The Unconstitutionality of the Laws of Congre-ss Prohibiting
Private Mails" (1844), by Lysander Spooner.
8. 17 STAT. 297 (1872), 39 U. S. C. A. c. 19 (1926). This branch of the system grew
rapidly. See PoSTAL STATISTICS, supra note 6; REP. PosTms= GrN. (1935) 93. For
a survey of this phase of the postal service see UxtED STATES PosAx Mo:,r-ODMm Sys-
mr (1915). The establishment of a postal money-order system is a valid exercise of the
postal power. Bolognesi v. United States, 189 Fed. 335 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911), crt. denied,
223 U. S. 726 (1911).
9. 36 STAT. 814 (1910) as amended, 39 U. S. C. A. c. 20 (1926). Private banking failures
in the last four years have led to a tremendous increase in postal savings depoits. See
PosTAL STATISTCS, supra note 6; RP. PosnrAsTa GrT. (1935) 94.
10. 37 STAT. 557 (1912), 39 U.S. C. A. § 240 (1928); cf. 43 STAT. 1057 (1925), as amended
by 45 STAT. 942, 39 U. S. C. A. § 247 (1928).
11. Thus in 1935 the post-office sold documentary, internal revenue stamps, and stamps
for the Bureau of Biological Survey of the Department of Agriculture. Rnr. Posr- s=n
Gr-,. (1935) XIV. The Potato Act of 1935 provided for the imposition of a tax to be
collected by the sale of stamps at post-offices. 49 STAT. 783, 7 U. S. C. A. § S02 (f) (1935),
repealed, Act of Feb. 10, 1936, c. 42. A similar provision is contained in the Social Security
Act. 49 STAT. 638, 42 U. S. C. A. § 1109 (1935).
12. Between the dates of March 1, 1935 and June 30, 1939, the Post Office Department
sold United States Savings Bonds to 497,000 purchasers with a total maturity value of
$128,000,000. REP. PosTAssm Gr-. (1935) XIV. During the World War, the Depart-
ment aided in the flotation of the Liberty Loans by the sale of thrift stamps.
13. For a more complete discussion of this phase of the postal service see Roams,
PosTAl. Powia or Conauss (1916) 30-35.
14. A typical protest: "The Post Office Department in Business," address by W. R.
Lence at the Propeller Club in New Orleans, Oct. 27, 1932 (N. Y. Pub. Lib. *c. p. v. 2528).
15. KELLY, U-NrrE STATES PosTAL Pouc" (1931) passint.
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a powerful proprietary authority of as yet undefined extent. Although no
case squarely involving the point has ever come before the courts, it would
appear-that in addition to selecting post-routes the federal government may
build and maintain post-roads.16 Since this grant keeps pace with the scien-
tific advance of the nation and is not limited to the means of communication
known and in use at the time the Constitution was adopted, 17 it follows that
Congress can construct and operate railroads, 18 airlines, 9 and telegraph and
telephone systems 20 Moreover, with the exercise of federal condemnation
powers21 it would seem possible to nationalize the existing facilities.22 Those
features of the present services which are not directly involved in the trans-
mission of intelligence could nevertheless be continued by the government on
the theory that they are incidental private undertakings which render more
efficient a governmental agency2 3 The same principle has been applied to
16. ROGERS, PosTAL PowEa or CONGRESS (1916) 61-81; PomEmoy, CoNsrITuox0AL
LAW (10th ed. 1888) § 412; HALL, CoNsTrnvU OAo LAW (1925) § 321; MAGRUDER AND
CLAME, CONSTITUTION (1933) 94 (in conjunction with war and commerce powers); Bu~iwox,
LAW OF =E ArimuCm CONsrn'uTON (1922) 340 (same). But see PuTmrE, Uiumzo STATES
COxsTrrunoNAL LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY (1908) 255. 2 STORY, CoM MEurNks (5th ed.
1891) c. 18 contains a full discussion of the point involved. The Cumberland Road cases
(Seabright v. Stokes, 44 U. S. 151 (1845); Niel, Moore & Co. v. Ohio, 44 U. S. 120
(1845); Achison v. HIuddleson, 53 U. S. 293 (1851)], turn on the question of compacts
between the federal government and the states, but Rogers [supra, at 96] thinks they
plainly imply the power to establish post-roads encompasses the power to build and
maintain them. Cf. Dickey v. Maysville, etc., Co., 37 Ky. 113 (1838). He deems the
point clinched by the cases involving eminent domain and federal incorporation of railway
and bridge companies. Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367 (1875) (exercise of federal
condemnation powers for purposes of erecting combined courthouse, post-office, customs
house, United States' depository, and internal-revenue and pension offices); California v.
Pacific R. Co., 127 U. S. 1 (1887) (under the postal, war, and commerce powers Congress
may build or cause to be built a railroad and give a federal franchise to a corporation for
the latter); United States v. Inlots, Fed. Cas. No. 15,441 (C. C. S. D. Ohip 1873) (without
state consent Congress, under the postal power, may condemn land for the purpose of
building a post office); Latinette v. City of St. Louis, 201 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912)
(Congress, under the postal and commerce powers, may build or authorize the building
of an interstate bridge across a navigable stream and may empower a municipality to con-
demn lands for that purpose); see Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24, 33 (1907).
17. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1 (1877).
18. Cf. California v. Pacific R. Co., 127 U. S. 1 (1887), cited note 16, supra.
19. Congress, it is claimed, has the power to provide landing fields for mail planes,
MAGRUDER AND CLAIRE, THE CoNsTmrruoN (1933) 95.
20. Cf. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1 (1877).
21. See the condemnation cases cited note 16, supra.
22. ROGERS, POSTAL POWER OF CONGRESS (1916) 150-156; CoRwIN, CoNsunorioN (1926)
29 (under the postal and commerce powers). Acquisition of telegraph lines Is made easy
by a statute which, after granting telegraph companies the right of way over or through the
public domain, military or post roads, and navigable streams, stipulates that the federal
government may for postal, military, or other purposes purchase at an appraised value all
the property of the companies which avail themselves of the above privileges. 14 STAT.
221 (1866), 47 U. S. C. A. §§ 1, 4 (1926).
23. Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U. S. 738 (1824); First Nat. Bank v. Fellows,
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justify, under the commerce clause, national ownership of hydro-electric units
and the sale of power incidentally generated by them.2 4 Thus the ownership
of huge developments has been sanctioned where the grant was merely of power
to regulate an activity, interstate commerce. It is reasonable to suppose
that since the grant in the post-roads clause is both plenary and proprietary
an equal if not greater authority to acquire property under it will be recog-
nized by the courts.
Power of Exclusion frot the Mails
The postal clause is one of the primary founts of national police power.
Police regulations which stem from this constitutional source generally stand
on the congressional power to exclude from the mails.25 Certain regulations
are, of course, necessary to the protection of the physical facilities of the
system and to the convenient handling of matter accepted for mailing. Among
these may be mentioned laws making criminal the conversion or destruction
of mail matter or the instrumentalities employed by the postal serviceO and
laws prescribing the size and weight of mailable material.27  In the same
category are rules which render non-mailable matter which is inherently
244 U. S. 416 (1917); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1021). The
Smith case involved the constitutionality of the Federal Farm Loan Act, 39 Sr,%T. 360
(1916) [since amended by 42 STAr. 1454 (1923) and Exac. ORDm 6034 (1933)], 12 U. S.
C. A. § 241 (1926), which set up federally financed banks to facilitate the making of low-
interest loans to farmers. It was sustained on the ground that the banks were established
as fiscal agents of the government, depositories of federal money, and purchasers of
United States bonds and thus within the creative powers of Congress, even though they
were "intended in connection with other privileges and duties, to facilitate the making
of loans upon farm security at low rates of interest. This does not destroy the validity
of these enactments any more than the general banking powers destroyed the authority of
Congress to create the United States Bank, or the authority given to national banks to carry
on additional activities, destroyed the authority of Congress to create those institutions."
Id. at 211. In the Smith case the activity was carried on by a federally owned corpora-
tion. Such a corporation could be formed to take over the railroads, airplane lines, and
the telegraph and telephone systems. See on the subject of such corporations: V=
DoRN, Govmum ,= Own CoRPoRAtioNs (1926); Comment (1935) 83 U. or PA. L. REv.
346.
24. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53 (1913); Arizona
v. California, 283 U. S. 423 (1931); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 56 Sup.
Ct. 466 (1936).
25. Exclusion from the mails is not the sole means of exercising postal police power.
Cheaper rates are given to certain articles in order to encourage their circulation. Pub-
lications issued at regular intervals and circulated free or mainly free [48 STr%. 8M0, 39 U.
S. C. A. § 293b (1934)], books sent by public libraries or asociations not organized for
profit [45 SrTA. 953, 39 U. S. C. A. § 293a (1928)], and reading matter for the blind
[48 STAT. 678, 39 U. S. C. A. § 331 (1934)] are so favored. The section admitting new-s-
papers to the lower second-class mailing rates [20 STAT. 359 (1879), as amended by 48
SrAr. 928, 39 U. S. C. A. § 226 (1934)], is likewise a beneficial police measure. But see
p. 306, infra, where the regulatory features of this statute are discussed.
26. PosTAL LAws AND REGu.ATiOs or 1932, §§ 2336-2349.
27. Id. §§ 577-588
1936]
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dangerous to the health and safety of postal employees.28 But these are not,
strictly speaking, the police regulations referred to above. Regulations of this
class, by declaring various articles to be non-mailable, seek to protect the
health, safety, and morals of the senders and recipients of mail matter and
the public at large. Thus Congress has denied admittance to the mails to all
matter on the outside of which is contained a defamatory, threatening, or
obscene communication. 29  Seditious writings are barred.80  Obscene matter
and articles adapted or intended to prevent conception or produce abortions
and circulars giving information as to where the same may be obtained likewise
fall under a ban.81 The use of the postal system is denied to those who seek
to employ it to consummate a fraudulent scheme or obtain money or property
under false pretenses.8 2 Lottery tickets and circulars or advertisements con-
cerning them,33 prize-fight films,34 insect pests,35 intoxicating liquors,80 and
small arms capable of being concealed on the person8 T are also non-mailable.
Periodicals are denied the cheap second-class mail rates, and thus for all
practical purposes excluded from the use of the mails, unless paid-for adver-
tising is clearly distinguished from editorial, feature and news items, and
28. 35 STAT. 1131 (1909), as amended by 48 STAT. 1063, 18 U. S. C. A. § 340 (1934).
29. 25 STAT. 187 (1888), as amended, 18 U. S. C. A. § 335 (1926). Warren v. United
States, 183 Fed. 718 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910) (section is constitutional). See also 47 STAT.
649 (1932), as amended by 49 STAT. 427, 18 U. S. C. A. § 338a (1935), which is the recently
enacted extortion statute.
30. 40 STAT. 230 (1917), 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 343-345 (1926). The statute is valid.
Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U S. 407 (1921); Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246
Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917). The postmaster is to judge whether the matter offered
for mailing offends the statute and the courts will not disturb his finding unless he is
clearly wrong. Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, mipra; Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, s$1pra;
Gitlow v. Kily, 44 F. (2d) 227 (S. D. N. Y. 1930).
31. 17 STAT. 302 (1873), as amended to 36 STAT. 1339 (1911), 18 U. S. C. A. § 334
(1926). The constitutionality of the section has never been contested in the Supreme
Court. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 508 (1904). In affirming con-
victions, however, the Court has approved the validity of the section sub silentio. Grimm
v. United States, 156 U. S. 694 (1895); Swearingen v. United States, 161 U. S. 446 (1896);
Dunlop v. United States, 165 U. S. 486 (1897); United States v. Limehouse, 285 U. S. 424
(1932). "Indecent" within the meaning of the statute also includes "matter of a character
tending to incite arson, murder or assassination." 36 STAT. 1339 (1911), 18 U. S. C. A.
§ 334 (1926). This portion of the section is valid. Magon v. United States, 248 Fed. 201
(C. C. A. 9th, 1918), cert. denied, 249 U. S. 618 (1919).
32. 25 STAT. 873 (1889), as amended by 35 STAT. 1130 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. § 338
(1926). The section is valid. Badders v. United States, 240 U. S. 391 (1916); New v.
United States, 245 Fed. 710 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917), cert. denied, 246 U. S. 665 (1918).
33. 17 STAT. 302 (1872), as amended to 35 STAT. 1129 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. § 336 (1926).
The section is constitutional. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1877); In re Rapier,
143 U. S. 110 (1892); Homer v. United States, 143 U. S. 570 (1892).
34. 37 STAT. 240 (1912), 18 U. S. C. A. § 405 (1926). Cf. Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S.
325 (1915) (portion of section which prohibits importation of prize fight films held valid
under commerce clause).
35. 33 STAT. 1270 (1905), 7 U. S. C. A. § 143 (1926).
36. 35 STAT. 1131 (1909), as amended to 48 STAT. 1063, 18 U. S. C. A. § 340 (1934).
37. 44 STAT. 1059, 18 U. S. C. A. § 361 (1927).
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unless a sworn statement is filed with the postmaster general and the post-
master at the office of which the publication is entered, setting forth certain
information as to its ownership and management. 8
Federal police power can also make itself felt in regulations which are
designed to complement state legislation. The first bill of this nature based
on the postal authority of Congress was sponsored by Calhoun in 1835. It
sought to prevent the introdudtion of anti-slavery literature into states which
prohibited its circulation, and would, in effect, have denied the use of the
mails to such publications when addressed to southern destinationsP? The
bill was never passed. A statute somewhat similar in form was enacted in
1917 which made criminal the use of the mails to carry liquor advertising
into states which had placed a ban upon such advertising. ° This legislation
was repealed in 1934.' From time to time, bills have been offered with the
purpose of filling gaps in state blue-sky legislation by forbidding the use of the
mails to evade local regulations42 The most recent example of complementary
federal legislation is contained in Section 8 of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act. 43 This section prohibits the ownership of interests in com-
peting gas and electric units by holding companies in violation of state law
and denies them the use of the mails to consummate the acquisition of the
illegal interest.
The constitutionality of the use of the postal clause to the end that state
regulation be made more efficient has never been before the Supreme Court.
However, analogous laws which are based on the commerce clause and which
bear the imprimatur of the Court provide ample precedent and all but remove
the question of constitutionality. Thus a statute is valid which forbids the
shipment into a state of goods in violation of state law:.' Again the Court
has approved the type of enactment which obliterates the original package
doctrine with respect to certain goods and renders them amenable to state
38. 37 STAT. 553, 554 (1912), as amended by 47 STAT. 1486, 39 U. S. C. A. §§ 233,
234 (1933). These requirements are constitutional. Lewis Pub. Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S.
288 (1913).
39. See the discussion in 6 McASTE, HisrORy or rn Prorrx or Tim Urrm STATEs
(1883) 288-291.
40. 39 STAT. 1069 (1917), as amended to 40 STAT. 1151 (1919), 18 U. S. C. A. § 341
(1926).
41. Act of Jan. 11, 1934, c. 1, tit. 1, § 12, 48 STAT. 316.
42. See Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. S75, 73d. Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1933) (A Study of the Economic and Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal
Securities Act) 325-328.
43. 49 STAT. 817, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79h (1935).
44. The section appears to be invalid as a postal provision. See p. 321, infra.
45. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311 (1917) (intoxicating
liquors). This case established the constitutionality of 37 STAT. 699 (1913), reenacted,
49 STAT. 877, 27 U. S. C. A. § 122 (1935). Cf. 49 STAT. 494, 49 U. S. C. A. § 61 (1935)
(prison goods), which is valid by analogy. See also Rupert v. United States, 181 Fed.
87 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910), which held valid a statute [Lacey Act, 31 ST,%T. 183 (1900), as
amended to 49 STAT. 380, 18 U. S. C. A. § 392 (1935)] prohibiting the interstate sbipment
of game killed in violation of state law.
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regulation upon delivery to the consignee.40  Such legislation constitutes neither
a delegation of the powers of Congress nor an enlargement of the powers of
the states.47
Again, the congressional power to exclude from the mails is exercised to
supplement federal regulation in other fields. Thus certain publications which
violate the copyright laws are non-mailable. 48  The use of the mails in
connection with a counterfeiting scheme is forbidden.49 So also, the Espionage
Act of 1917 contains a section which makes it unlawful to send through the
mails any matter in violation of its provisions.50
The reasoning employed to bring exclusionary legislation within the con-
stitutional fold is not quite clear. Out of the varying and sometimes obscure
viewpoints which have been taken, two theories stand out.51 One proceeds
as follows: 5 2 before the Constitution was adopted each state had the power to
establish post-offices and post-roads; in the exercise of this power it could
have promulgated police regulations designed to protect its citizens against
harmful influence through misuse of the postal system; by adopting the Consti-
tution the states completely surrendered to the federal government all postal
powers (the incidental police power included) which they formerly possessed;
where the public health, safety, or morals demand it, Congress, by excluding
matter from the mails, may indirectly deal with crime and immorality within the
states, although direct intervention would be unauthorized. The other theory 8 is
based on the fact that the government owns the postal system. It maintains,
that as proprietor the United States may exclude matter from the mails on the
ground of public policy; that the use of the mails is a privilege and not a right; 4
and that as a consequence Congress is not limited in its exclusionary powers
to actually or potentially dangerous articles, but may deny the facilities of
the postal system to matter, the circulation of which it deems unwise or un-
desirable.
Assuming that either of the above theories is sufficient to account for the
46. Whitfield v. Ohio, 56 Sup. Ct. 532 (1936) (prison goods--Hawes-Cooper Act,
45 STAT. 1084, 49 U. S. C. A. § 60 [1929]); In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891) (intoxicating
liquors-Wilson Act, 26 STAT. 313 [1890], 27 U. S. C. A. § 121 (1926]); Rhodes v. Iowa,
170 U. S. 412 (1898) (same).
47. In re Rabrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891).
48. 35 STAT. 1083 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. §§ 32, 33 (1926); 20 STAT. 359 (1879), 39
U. S. C. A. § 227 (1926).
49. 25 STAT. 873 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. § 338 (1926).
50. 40 STAT. 230 (1917), 18 U. S. C. A. § 343 (1926); see note 30, supra.
51. Professor Cushman mentions a third, based on the special duty to protect the
people from the dangers inherent in an efficient postal system. Cushman, National Police
Power Under the Postal Clause of the Constitution (1920) 4 MiN,. L. Rav. 402, 420, This
theory is merged in the first theory set forth in the text.
52. In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110 (1892); Brief, submitted by Samuel Untermeyer, Coun-
sel, contained in Report of the Committee to Investigate the Concentration of Control of
Money and Credit, H. R. REP. No. 1593, 63d Cong., 3d Sess., Ser. No. 424 (1913) 120.
53. This is the theory adopted by Professor Cushman. Cushman, supra note 51, at 421,
54. As to whether the use of the mails is a privilege or a right and the Importance of
the distinction, see p. 309, infra:
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source of postal police power, there still remains to be determined the limits
within which the power may be exercised. Here the field of speculation must
be invaded to some extent, for since no law based on the postal grant has ever
been declared unconstitutional, there exists no judicially settled boundary
about the clause. Dictum and the general principles of constitutional law
provide some guide. Thus it is clear that federal legislation based upon the
postal power, just as in the case of legislation based upon any other con-
stitutional grant, is subject to the prohibitions contained in the first ten amend-
ments.55 No postal statute may curtail the freedom of religion50 or of the
pressy7 authorize an unlawful search or seizure,68 or deprive a person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. While the field is fertile for
moot questions concerning the first three provisions mentioned, it is in the
application of the last, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, that the
greatest difficulty is encountered.
Immediately, upon entering the field of due process, the pr6blem is pre-
sented--does the Constitution insure an individual the right"0 to use the mails,
the privilege0 to use the mails, or merely an hnmunityo' from state legislation
on the subject? If he has merely an immunity from state legislation, the further
inquiry must be-has the individual by the law of the states a right or a privi-
lege to use the mails? Thus in any event it is apparently necessary to decide
whether the claim to the use of the mails is a right or a privilege. The Supreme
55. 1 WiLTo L:BY, Tn. CoNsnrrumoNm LAw oF =rn UrrM STAmS (2d ed. 1929) § 67.
56. See Cushman, supra note 51, at 426.
57. 2 WiLLouGHBY, op. cit. supra note 55, § 657; ROGERS, PoSTAL, Pow=R or Co.;onxs
(1916) 117 et seq.; Cushman, supra note 51, at 426.
58. RoGEms, PosrA. Powm or CoxGRss (1916) 123-126; 2 Wnr.oucarr, op. cit. supra
note 55, § 657. It is made a crime for postal employees to open mail matter. 35 StAT.
1125 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. § 318 (1926). Further, exclusionary legiAation usually con-
tains clauses restricting the opening of mail matter to authorized employees of the dead
letter office or persons armed with a proper Search warrant. See for example, 40 STAT.
230, 18 U. S. C. A. § 343 (1926).
59. A right is given: Hoover v. McChesney, 81 Fed. 472 (C. C. D. Ky. 1897); see
Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 432 (1921) (dissenting opinion by Bran-
deis); ROGERS, PosrAL Powm OF CONRESS (1916) 178
60. A privilege is given: Missouri Drug Co. v. Wyman, 129 Fed. 623 (C. C. E. D. Mo.
1904); see Cushman, supra note 51, at 123; Pam, Powers of Regulation Vested in Congress
(1910) 24 HARv. L. REv. 77, 99-100; Barrett, Is There a Nalonal Police Power? (1934) 14
B. U. L. Rav. 243, 267. But see the writer's change of position in Barrett, The Underlying
Conflict Between Our Constitutional Scheme of Government, and the Apparent Trend of
Congressional Legislation and Executive Administration (1936) 16 B. U. L. RE%. 10, SO.
61. The contention that the Constitution provides only an immunity from state legisla-
tion has been made with reference to the interstate commerce clause. GM%'r, TArE Cor-
imaRc- CrAusa (1932) 36, 39. By analogy it applies here. The reasoning is as follows:
The Constitution is here dealing with public and not private law, it being concerned with
setting a boundary between state and federal jurisdiction; before the Constitution was
adopted, the right or privilege to use the postal system arose from state law; the Con-
stitution merely transferred the power to maintain and control the post-office from the
state to the federal government; the change did not affect the nature of an individual's
claim upon the use of the system, but merely established an immunity from state legislation.
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Court has neither directly passed upon the point nor indicated by dictum what
stand it might take. Since no consistent terminology has been in general
use, it would be futile to seek a solution in the welter of loose language with
which both the higher and lower courts clothe their conception of an indi-
vidual's claim to the use of the postal system. While the distinction between
right and privilege is of academic importance,62 practically, it would make a
difference only in the theory upon which a case of due process is brought.
The ultimate questions as to the extent of the postal power which the court
would have to answer would be substantially the same whether a right or
a privilege be involved. 63 Where only a privilege is involved one who attacks
the constitutionality of a postal statute is required to show unfair discrimination
or to go one step back and show interference with his right to do business.
If a right be involved, the denial thereof is sufficient to raise the question of
due process. Although the theory in each instance would differ, the basic
issues, as to the extent of the postal police power, are always identical.
Legislation By Indirection
The first inquiry addressed to a statute should be-is it a postal regulation;
for if it is determined that the power to enact the legislation has not been dele-
gated to Congress under the postal clause, the examination of its constitutional-
ity ends there. No probing to fix the extent of the postal power is necessary.
62. Thus, according to Hohfeldian terminology a right is a correlative of a duty and
a privilege is a correlative of no-right. HoEmLn, FUx DAx=TAL LEGAL CONCEPTIoNs (1923)
6, 60. Translated into terms applicable to the postal system: if an individual has a right,
there is a corresponding duty upon the government to carry mail matter which he sub-
mits; if he merely has a privilege, there is no duty upon the government and it may annex
conditions precedent to the use of the mails. See the discussion, as to the nature of the
conditions which may be imposed, in Cushman, supra note 51, at 424. See also, note 63,
infra.
63. Assuming that the use of the mails is a right, it is still subject to police regulation.
3 WnouGHBY, op. cit. supra note 55, § 1043. To hold a police regulation valid, It must
appear that the federal government has the general power tot enact it [cf. HuonEs, Tnu
SUPREME COURT (1928) 154-1561, and that this particular regulation is not unreasonable,
capricious or arbitrary [f. 3 WLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 55, at 1701-1706, 1772;
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 525 (1933)]. The latter inquiry is a factual test
which is applied to the circumstances of each case after the first-mentioned requirement
has been satisfied. The former requirement involves a decision as to whether the subject
matter regulated is amenable to police legislation. It also calls for a determination as to
which sovereignty, the state or the federal government, is the proper authority to promul-
gate the law. Now if it be assumed that the use of mails is a privilege, it may still be
urged that deprivation thereof makes it impossible to carry on a business and thus results
in a deprivation of that right (this contention is made in Pettergill, Is the Death Sentence
in the Senate Public Utility Holding Company Bill Unconstitutional? 79 Cong. Rec., June
20, 1935, at 10218, 10233). Or it may be contended that the regulation is discriminatory
and that equal protection of the laws under the Fifth Amendment is denied. [Cushman,
supra note 51, at 439. Compare the doctrine of unconstitutional limitations. Merrill,
Unconstitutional Conditions (1929) 77 U. or PA. L. Rxv. 879; Hale, Unconstitutional Con-
ditions and Constitutional Rights (1935) 35 COL. L. Rxv. 321]. But in any event the same
questions as to the extent of police power must be answered.
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Just what is a postal statute and what is not is a question which admits of no
inclusive answer. Clearly, if Congress employs exclusion from the mails solely
as a sanction to enforce legislation not justifiable under any other grant, it has
not acted under the authority of the postal clause.64 Thus, if as once suggestedca
Congress should require every corporation, whether engaged in interstate com-
merce or not, to give the fullest publicity to its corporate affairs by filing a
report of its organization and business, and provide that non-compliance would
result in complete deprivation of the use of the mails, the enactment would
bear no substantial relation to the postal system and could in no wise be
classified as a postal law. 0
On the other hand, judicial approval has been obtained for purely police
regulation designed to regulate matters not intrinsically related to the post-
office.67 They are justified on the ground that the federal government is not
compelled to allow the postal system, an instrumentality within its control, to
be employed for improper ends. In all of these cases, however, the objection-
able practice was advanced through the use of the mails; while in the cor-
porate publicity proposal, the mails were involved only remotely. For example,
the use of the mails to perpetrate a fraud is forbidden. Here the letter con-
taiiiing the fraudulent offer is actually sent through the mails and the scheme
would be impossible of fruition were it not for the immediate utilization of the
postal facilities. But where the use of the mails is denied entirely without
regard to the nature of the article sent, it is obvious that the only nexus be-
tween the corporation regulated and the postal system is the universal necessity
of every business to resort to the mails in order to carry on its ordinary affairs.
To maintain that such a relation is sufficient to bring the postal power into
64. There exist two lines of cases on the question of legislation by indirection. One
line stands for the proposition that when Congress passes a law purporting to be in the
exercise of a particular congressional power, the Court may not inquire into the motive
underlying the law. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. 533 (1869); In re Kollock, 165 U. S.
526 (1397); Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903); McCray v. United States, 195 U. S.
27 (1904); United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366 (1909); Smith v.
Kana City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921); Arizona v. California, 283 U. S.
423 (1931). The other line of cases reveals that in many instances the Court has shown no
hesitation in going behind the declaration on the face of a statute. Child Labor Tax Case,
259 U. S. 20 (1922); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922); Linder v. United States, 263
U. S. 5 (1925) ; Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U. S. 475 (1926) ; United States v. Constantine, 296
U. S. 280 (1935); Hopkins Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 56 Sup. CL 235 (1935);
United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936). Cf. the instances where the Court in-
vestigated the motives of state legislatures, cited in Beck, Nullification by Indircclion (1910)
23 HEAv. L. Rxv. 413, 453 et seq. It is interesting to note that when Beck wrote his article
in 1910 there were no Supreme Court cases available for him to cite in favor of his con-
tention that legislation by indirection was improper. It is only in comparatively recent
times that the Court has resorted to investigations of Congresdonal motive. In every case
in the first line, the statute was sustained and in every case in the second line the statute was
held invalid. Here is one of the clearest illustrations of the statement that the Supreme
Court really remains unfettered by precedent.
65. Pam, supra note 60, at 99.
66. See Cushman, supra note 51, at 440.
67. See p. 306, supra.
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play, is to maintain that Congress can regulate every business, a reductlo ad
absurdum. And yet, as is usual in constitutional limitations there is no logical
stopping place between the two extremes. What is a postal regulation, will
probably become a question to be decided upon the facts of each case, much as
the question of what is "commerce" is determined in controversies arising
under the interstate commerce clause.08
The, Securities Act of 1933
Congress in recent legislation, the Securities Act of 1933,60 The Securities
Exchange Act of 193470 and The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,71
has resorted to the postal power in a more extreme fashion than ever before.
The court tests which -these enactments provoke will probably remove much
of the blur from the present roughly sketched judicial delineation of postal
police power. If the acts are sustained as postal regulations, then the post-
office clause will take its place alongside the commerce clause as a major source
of federal police authority.
The Securities Act (and this is also true of the two other acts) reflects the
widespread belief that the glare of public disclosure is one of the most efficacious
means of insuring fair corporate practice.72 Enforced publicity and other
forms of governmental control are justified by the proponents of the Act on
the ground that "when a corporation seeks funds from the public it becomes
in every true sense a public corporation. Its affairs cease to be the private
prerequisite of its bankers and managers; its bankers and managers themselves
become public functionaries."73  The Securities Act is the inaugural attempt
of the federal government to prevent the issuance of unsound securities. As
a condition precedent to a public offering through the mails or instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, it requires that there be filed a registration statement
containing information useful to the investor about the corporation, its offi-
cers, directors and principal stockholders, the underwriters, and the details
of the issue.74 Section five, the key enforcement section of the Act, contains
the prohibitions relating to interstate commerce and the mails.76 Insofar as
the mails are involved Section five makes it unlawful to use them to sell, or offer
to sell, by means of a prospectus or otherwise, or to send through the mails for
the purpose of sale, or delivery after sale, any unregistered security.10 It is
68. Cf. GAVIT, THE CoMmmcE CLA-usE (1932) cc. 4, S.
69. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 905, 15 U. S. C. A. c. 2A (1934).
70. 48 STAT. 881, 15 U. S. C. A. c. 2B (1934).
71. 48 STAT. 838, 15 U. S. C. A. c. 20 (1935).
72. See BRANDIas, OrHE PEoPLE's MONEY (1913) c. 5; cf. Robrlich, The New Deal
in Corporation Law (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 1167, 1170.
73. Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act II (Aug. 1933) 8 Fo uTUn 53, 111. See
also RoosEvxwr, Or OuR WAY (1934) 46; BxEL ANm MEwAs, Tnx MoDEM CoaRoRAxON
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) c. 4.
74. Securities Act §§ 5, 6, 7, 48 STAT. 77, 78 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 906, 15
U. S. C. A. §§ 77e, 77f, 77g (1934).
75. Only the postal provisions will be considered here.
76. Securities Act § Sa, 48 STAT. 77 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 906, 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 77e (a) (1934).
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likewise unlawful to send through the mails any prospectus relating to a regis-
tered security which prospectus does not conform to the requirements of the
Act.7  Further, unless such a prospectus accompanies or precedes it, no regis-
tered security may be sent. through the mails for the purpose of sale or delivery
after saleY7  Certain securities,7 9 including those issued before or within
sixty days after the passage of the Act,80 those sold by an issuer who is a resi-
dent or domestic corporation to persons resident in the same state,8 1 those
issued under government supervision,82 and those exchanged by an issuer with
its present security. holders are exempt83 from the above provisions. Again,
Section five applies only to issuers, underwriters and dealers (including brokers) ;
and they are subject to its provisions only under certain circumstances. Issuers
are subject to these provisions whenever they make a public offering.8 ' Deal-
ers (including underwriters no longer functioning as such with regard to the
security involved) are liable to the provisions of Section five as to transactions
in a security involving all or any part of an unsold allotment to or subscrip-
tion by such dealer as a participant in the distribution of the securities by the
issuer.8 5 Brokers are liable only when they solicit orders and not when they
merely execute the orders of their customers8 0
A person, who though not offering a security for sale, for a consideration
describes it in a letter; investment service, newspaper or any communication,
may not send the same through the mails without revealing the consideration
so paid. 7 The use of the mails to defraud is prohibited8 8
The Act also provides for civil liabilities. One who purchases from a seller
who violates Section five may "recover the consideration paid for such security
with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon
the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security." °8
Similarly, a vendor who sells a security by means of a false or misleading pro-
spectus sent through the mails is liable for the same measure of damages to the
77. Id. § 5 (b) (1), 48 STAT. 77 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 906, 1S U. S. C. A. § 77e
(b) (1) (1934).
78. Id. § 5 (b) (2), 48 STAT. 77 (1933), as amended by 48 Sr,%r. 905, 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 77e (b) (2) (1934).
79. Id. § 3 (a), 48 STAT. 75 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 905 (1934) and 49 STr.
557, 15 U. S. C. A. § 77c (a) (1935).
So. Id. (a) (1).81. Id. (a) (11).
82. Id. (a) (2), (6), (7), (8).
83. Id. (a) (9).
84. Securities Act § 4 (1), 48 STAT. 77 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 905, 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 77d (1) (1934).
85. Ibid.
86. Securities Act § 4 (2), 48 STAT. 77 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 906, 15 U. S.
C. A. § 77d (2) (1934).
87. Securities Act §17 (b), 48 STAT. 84, 15 U. S. C. A. § 77q (b) (1933).
88. Securities Act § 17 (a), 48 STAT. 84, 15 U. S. C. A. § 77q (a) (1933). This section
goes a bit further than the present mails fraud statute. See Herlands, Criminal Law Asperts
of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933) 67 U. S. L. REv. 562.
89. Securities Act § 12, 48 STAT. 84, 15 U. S. C. A. § 771 (1933).
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purchaser unless such vendor sustains "the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known" of the un-
truth or omission of any material statement therein contained. 0 Other civil
liabilities are imposed where the registration statement is false or misleading9 1
At the outset of a discussion of the constitutionality of the Act from the stand-
point of the postal power it must be noted that its proponents considered it,
primarily, a regulation of interstate commerce and argued its validity on that
basis, invoking the postal clause only as an incidental prop. 2  It would now
appear, however, that a stronger case can be built on the post-office clause. 0
The first inquiry, is the law a postal statute, must be answered in the affirma-
tive. Here the practice to be regulated, the fraudulent issuance of securities,
involves the use of the mails in a direct and proximate fashion. True the
Act regulates the issuance of all securities, whether fraudulent or not, but such
regulation is necessary to achieve the broad purposes of the law and is an in-
tegrated part of the general plan to prevent fraudulent use of the mails.
The second inquiry, is the regulation a valid exercise of the police power,
must likewise be answered in the affirmative, although more room for argu-
ment exists. Undoubtedly, issuance of securities is a matter which is subject
to state police legislation. 4  Such legislation has been upheld on the ground
that the state has the power to prevent the imposition of fraud on the public."
It appears reasonable to assume that the federal government has a similar
jurisdiction based on its power to prevent instrumentalities within its control
from being employed to defraud the public.0 0 As to arguments based on the
Tenth Amendment they augment the case for constitutionality. In the first
place, by specific provision in the Act, state regulations remain unaffected 0
Their requirements, necessitating the filing of reports and documents, must
still be obeyed. In the second place, the doctrine of divided sovereignty was
not incorporated into the Constitution to weaken the powers of government,
but to render them more effective. Complete control over the issuance of
securities might have been exercised by a single sovereign state before our
90. Ibid.
91. Securities Act § 11, 48 STAT. 82 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 907, 15 U. S.
C. A. § 77k (1934). For general treatments of the Act, see THoRPE AND ELMis, Tus FED-
ERAL SEcupTs ACT MA uAL (1933); LASSER AND GERARDI, FEDEmAL SECURITIEs ACT PRO-
cEDuRE (1934); MEYER, THE SEcuRITIES ExcHANGE AcT or 1934 (1934) 157 et seq.
92. At the committee hearings in the House, Mr. Thompson, one of the draftsmen of
the bill, pitched the Act squarely on the commerce clause, making no mention of the postal
power. Hearings Before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on tI. R.
4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 39, 40. Throughout both the hearings before the House
and the Senate no mention was made of the postal power. See Hearings, passim and
Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1933) passim.
93. Jones v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 79 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
94. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock
Yards Co., 242 U. S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U. S. 568 (1917).
95. See cases cited note 94, supra.
96. See p. 308, supra.
97. Securities Act § 18, 48 STAT. 85, 15 U. S. C. A. § 77r (1933).
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federal system was established. Can it be argued that in setting up the national
government, jurisdictional voids between state and national government were
intended? State regulation is admittedly unable to deal with the interstate
aspects of security selling. A state cannot control the mails, the chief sales
instrumentality which bridges the gap between the security seller and the
public.9s It is helpless against the activities of individuals operating from other
states.9 9 How then can it be maintained that the federal government, in
regulating these phases of the problem, invades the province of the states? The
Act respects the spirit of the Constitution when it confines its principal regula-
tory provisions to issues intended for an interstate traffic. Local issues, it
wisely leaves to state control.'0 0
The remaining questions, do the means selected have a real and substantial
relation to the end sought to be obtained, and are the means reasonable, also
appear susceptible of affirmative response. It cannot be denied that were the
mails closed to fraudulent transactions concerning the sale of securities, the
exclusion would be impeccable in so far as constitutionality is involved. In-
deed such transactions have been held to fall within the present mail frauds
act.10 But such regulation, because of administrative difficulties, falls far
short of effective control. Consequently, it is necessary to impose compulsory
registration of all issues in order to sift the good from the bad before public
offering.' 0 2  The civil and criminal liabilities imposed tend to deter the offer-
ing of fraudulent securities, the evasion of registration, and the falsification of
registration statements. Charges of intermeddling in the affairs of corporations
cannot be sustained. The Act merely requires that information of use to
the investor in judging the financial condition of the corporation and the per-
sonal equation of those who control it, be filed for public reference. Trade
secrets and the like, if contained in a registration statement will be protected
and the public denied access thereto by the Commission.' 0 3 Transactions
which, are innocuous in and of themselves may be prohibited on the ground
that such prohibition is reasonably essential and incident to the main pur-
pose of an enactment' 0 4 All the provisions of the law satisfy this description.
98. RocERs, PosTAr. Powm or CoYGRESS (1916) 127 et sceq. And see 2 Vxr.ououmn,
TnE CoNsTrrmnoYAL LAW or =nE UxTnm STATES (2d ed. 1929) § 660a.
99. See Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R.
4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 10, 99.
100. Securities Act § 3 (a) (11), 48 STAT. 906, 15 U. S. C. A. § 77c (a) (11) (1934).
101. Stephens v. United States, 41 F. (2d) 440 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930), cert. denied, 282
U. S. 880 (1930); Hydney v. United States, 44 F. (2d) 134 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930), cer.
denied, 233 U. S. 824 (1931); Foshay v. United State-, 63 F. (2d) 205 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934),
cert. denied, 291 U. S. 674 (1934); Levine v. United States, 79 F. (2d) 364 (C. C. A. 9th,
1935); Greenbaum v. United States, 80 F. (2d) 113 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
102. That this is a reasonable requirement, see Jones v. Securities and Exchange Comm.,
79 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
103. Cf. Securities Exchange Act § 24, 48 STAT. 901, 15 U. S. C. A. § 7Sx (1934). It
is presumed that this provision will be followed by the Securities and Exchange Comm.J'on
even though information be filed with it under another act.
104. Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192 (1912), and cases there cited; United
States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 195 (1919); Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256 (1927);
Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608 (1935).
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They appear to be intimately associated with and well calculated to achieve
the laudatory purposes of the Act.
Finally, the Act cannot be successfully assailed as discriminatory. With the
general purpose of the law, the extermination of fraud in the issuance of secur-
ities, instinct in every section, it adversely affects no individual not proximately
related to the transactions involved.10 Thus not every seller of securities not
registered or otherwise issued in violation of the Act comes within its scope.
Only those intimately associated with the actual issuance, the issuer, the under-
writer and the dealer are regulated. There appears to be a reasonable basis for
discrimination and the draftsmen of the Act have kept within it.
The Securit,ies Exchange Act of 1934
Whatever source of federal power may be advanced to sustain the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, it is apparent that it cannot rest upon the postal clause.
An examination of its principal provisions conclusively reveals this. Roughly,
the purpose of the Act proceeds along three paths: °1 0 to control credit in security
transactions in order to limit speculation and avoid the unsettling economic
disorders resulting therefrom; to regulate the security markets in order to pre-
vent unfair practices; and to regulate securities publicly traded in so as to
provide the purchaser with adequate information and prevent the taking of un-
fair advantage by insiders of information not available to the general public.
Credit control is effectuated through provisions restricting the amount of credit
which may be extended to customers engaged in margin transactions.10 7
Security market control is obtained by compelling registration in the case
of a securities exchange' 08 and authorizing the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission to issue rules for the registration of dealers and brokers on over-the-
counter markets. 0 9 The registration statement of the exchange must con-
tain information as to its membership, rules and organization.110  It is
made unlawful for any broker, dealer or exchange to employ the mails
or instrumentalities of interstate commerce for the purpose of using the
105. See Bumiler, Exemptions of Securities and Transactions Under the Federal Securi-
ties Act of 1933 (1936) 10 O. or Cn~r. L. RFv. 125.
106. MrYim, Scuarns EXcHANGE AcT or 1934 (1934) 11; Securities Exchange Act § 2,
48 STAT. 881, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78b (1934). Cf. The Report of the Committee to Investigate
the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit, H. R. REP. No. 1593, 63d Cong, 3d
Sess. Ser. No. 424 (1913) (Pujo Investigation) and the bill recommended by the Committee
(p. 170-173).
107. Securities Exchange Act § 7, 48 STAT. 886, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78g (1934). Loans to
brokers and dealers are also regulated. [Id. § 8, 48 STAT. 888, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78h (1934)].
Flexibility is lent to these provisions by placing their administration in the hands of the
Federal Reserve Board with the power to adjust the details of the control plan by reasonable
regulations. [Id. §§ 7, 8, supra].
108. Securities Exchange Act § 5, 48 STAT. 885, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78e (1934).
109. Id. § 15(a), 48 STAT. 895, 15 U. S. C. A. § 8o (1934).
110. Id. § 6 (a), 48 STAT. 885, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78f (a) (1934). Before an exchange will
be registered it must show that its rules provide for expelling, suspending and disciplining
members for just cause (just cause must include wilful violation of the provisions of the
Act). Id. § 6 (b), 48 STAT. 884, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78f (b) (1934).
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facilities of an exchange to effect or report any transaction in a security
unless such exchange is registered. 1 1 Brokers who trade in their own account
are subjected to regulation designed to minimize the conflict between their own
and their customer's interests." 2  Certain manipulative devices have been pro-
hibited (including wash and matched sales) and others (including pegging, short
sales, and stop loss orders) left to regulation by the Commission." 3
Security control is given to the Commission by registration provisions which
make it unlawful to effect any transaction in an unregistered security (other
than an exempted security) on a national securities exchange1 1 4  Solicitation of
proxies through the mails or otherwise is subjected to the regulation of the
Commission?- 5  The unfair use of "inside" information is discouraged by
provisions which make it mandatory upon officers, directors and principal
stockholders to file reports of their security holdings and keep the same up to
date by supplementary monthly reports whenever a change in their holdings is
made." 6 Should any in this group make a profit by the purchase and sale, or
sale and purchase of the corporation's securities within a six month period, such
profit is recoverable at the suit of the corporationPT7 Further, no officer,
director, or principal stockholder may sell short or on credit the securities of
his corporation."18 The Securities and Exchange Commission is given broad
authority to investigate and cause to be enjoined violations of the Act."0
Where in its opinion such action is necessary or appropriate to the protection
of the investor1 20 it may suspend for a period not exceeding one year or with-
draw the registration of an exchange; deny, suspend for not more than one
year, or expel any member or officer of a securities exchange; summarily sus-
pend trading in any registered security for not more than ten days; and with
the approval of the President, summarily suspend all trading on an exchange
for not more than ninety days. The Commission may also alter the rules of an
exchange where the Commission deems such change to be in the public interest
and the exchange refuses to act.121
It requires no deep insight into the nature of stock exchange practice to
111. Id. § 5, 48 STAT. 885, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78e (1934).
112. Id. § 11 (a), (b), 48 STAT. 891, 14 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a), (b) (1934).
113. Id. § 9, 48 STAT. 889, 15 U S. C.A. § 78i (1934); id. § 10, 48 STAT. 891, 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 78j (1934).
114. Id. § 12 (a), 48 STAT. 892, 15 U. S. C. A. § 781 (a) (1935). Rtgistration state-
ments are filed with the exchange and the Conm44on and must contain information rela-
five to the organization and financial condition of the corporation, the extent of the security
holdings of its officer, directors, stockholders, and underwriters, and other items. (Id. § 12
(b), 48 STAT. 892, 15 U. S. C. A. § 781 (b) (1935)]. In addition, periodical and other re-
ports, intended to keep the filed information up to date, must be furnished. [Id. § 13,
48 STAT. 894, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78m (1934)].
115. Id. § 14, 48 STAT. 895, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78n (1934).
116. Id. § 16 (a), 48 STAT. 896, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78 p (a) (1934).
117. Id. § 16 (b), 48 STAT. 896, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78p (b) (1934).
118. Id. § 16 (c), 48 STAT. 896, 15 U. S. C. A. § 7 8p (c) (1934).
119. Id. § 21, 48 STAT. 899, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78u (1934).
120. Id. § 19 (a), 48 STAT. 898, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78s (a) (1934).
121. Id. § 19 (b), 48 STAT. 898, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78s (b) (1934).
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realize that the Act, briefly sketched above, is not a postal statute.122 For
example, one vital section of the Act involves the mails and provides that the
use of the postal system is denied to those who desire to report or effect a
transaction in a security or an unregistered exchange. 123 If it were sought to
sustain this provision on the postal power, the attempt would fail. Here would
be a clear instance of legislation by indirection. The actual practices which
the enactment seeks to regulate are for the most part remote from the use of
the mails. In addition the blanket prohibition on using the mails for any trans-
action on an unregistered exchange is far too broad.
However, it does not appear that such an extreme stand will be taken by
the government. Commissioner Landis, the moving spirit behind the Act, at
hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
frankly admitted that the Act's only hope was based on the interstate com-
merce power 24 and added that "the other powers have been dragged in inci.
dentally ... you try to get as many props as you can to support a particular
matter."' 25 As to the last point, that other props are important on particular
matters, it may be said that, if the Act can be sustained on the commerce power,
then many of the postal provisions will be valid as regulations designed to
complement government control authorized under another delegated power.1 20
There is some force in the contention that a number of the postal provisions
may stand, independent of the remainder of the Act, solely on the postal
power. Among these may be mentioned the sections rendering non-mailable
communications intended to aid in the manipulations of market prices 21 and
122. The Act resembles in form and scope (although it would appear that It goes much
further) the Grain Futures Act, 42 STAT. 998 (1922), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-17 (1926). The
latter was subjected to a test in Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1923). The
Court placed its approval on portions of the Act but refused to consider the postal and In-
terstate commerce provisions [42 STAT. 999 (1922), 7 U. S. C. A. § 6 (1926)]. While the
Court's hesitancy is equivocal it might be ascribed to doubts as to the constitutionality of
this form of legislation. Commissioner Landis grounds the Securities Exchange Act on
cases like the Board of Trade case, supra. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on H. R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 32.
123. Securities Exchange Act § 5, 48 STAT. 885, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78e (1934).
124. Hearings, supra note 138, at 17, 32, 901.
125. Id. at 32.
126. Cf. notes 48-50, supra. The sections referred to in the text are Securities Exchange
Act § 5, 48 STAT. 885, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78e (1934) (use of mails to transact business on un-
registered exchange prohibited) ; id. § 15, 48 STAT. 895, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78o (1934) (regu-
lation of over-the-counter market transactions through the mails); id. § 30, 48 STAT. 904,
15 U. S. C. A. § 78dd (1934) (prohibiting use of the mails to trade on foreign exchanges In
order to evade the provisions of the Act).
127. Securities Exchange Act § 9, 48 STAT. 889, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78i (1934); id. § 10,
48 STAT. 891, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78j (1934). Here congressional power to prevent the malls
from being employed as an instrumentality for the advancement of fraud would be suffi-
dent to sustain the sections. Under the present mail frauds statute there has been secured
at least one conviction for stock market manipulations. United States v. Brown, 79 F.
(2d) 321 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) (wash sales and bribing of customers' men).
Cf. 49 STAT. 981, 27 U. S. C. A. § 205 (f) (1935), setting up standards for liquor adver-
tisements sent through the mails. It is sustainable on the same ground-prevention of fraud.
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solicitations of proxies in violation of rules laid down by the Commission.223
Despite the separability clause in the Act it is necessary to find that independent
of the other provisions of the statute these could be given legal effect and that
Congress intended them to stand even though the remainder of the Act fell.'!
The clause merely raises a presumption of divisibility which can be overcome by
a showing that Congress would not have been satisfied with the Act unless the
discarded parts were retained. 30 Whether these provisions would meet this
test is conjectural. It may be said of them however, that if they were separately
reenacted they would be validj31
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
Recognizing the harm resulting to investor and consumer from the abuse of
the holding company as an economic instrumentality 02 and the patent in-
ability of the states to cope with the vast interstate and in some instances
nation-wide systems which have arisenim Congress, by means of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 has sought to impose regulation co-
extensive with the evil. The Act provides for close supervision of the internal
affairs of holding companies and the eventual liquidation of those units which
cannot show an economic justification for their existence.P 4  As in the acts
previously outlined, registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission
is required. Unless a holding company is registered it may not own or operate
any utility assets for the interstate transmission of manufactured gas or
electrical energy or actually transport the same in interstate commerce.3n Nor
may it use the mails or any instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect or
perform any service, sales or construction contract with a public-utility company
128. Securities Exchange Act § 14a, 48 STAT. 895, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78n (a) 1934. This
section was inserted to prevent blind signing of proxies by dealers and brokers wYho carry
securities for stockholders, and by the stockholders themselves, v.ith the consequent per-
petuation of the present management. That this lack of intelligent voting is an evil and
on occasions provides an avenue for fraud cannot be doubted. The situation can exist only
so long as the use of the mails to solicit is allowed. Here denial of the use of the mails may
be justified as an attempt to avoid abuse of the mails.
129. Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286 (1924). A separability clause provides a rule
of construction, "But it is an aid merely; not an inexorable command." Id. at 290. Cf.
Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922).
130. Wiiams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929); Utah Power & Light Co. v.
Pfost, 2S6 U. S. 165 (1932).
131. See notes 127, 128, supra.
132. Comment (1936) 45 YAzE L. J. 468, 472-478.
133. Id. at 478-481.
134. Public Utility Holding Company Act § 11, 49 STAT. 820, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79k (1935).
This is the famous "Death Sentence" section. For a brief holding it unconstitutional, see
(Pettergill, Is the "Death Sentence" in the Senate Public Utility Holding Company Bill Con-
stitutional?) 79 Cong. Rec., June 20, 1935, at 10218. For a brief sustaining the Act, see
Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on J. 1725, 74th Cong., let. Sess.
(1935) 807-820.
135. Public Utility Holding Company Act § 4(a) (1), 49 STAT. 812, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79d
(a) (1) (1935).
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or holding company;1 3° to publicly offer for sale or exchange any security of
a member of its system or any holding company, or sell any such security, with
reason to believe that public offering or distribution will be made through
the mails or any instrumentality of interstate commerce; 137 to negotiate for
or acquire any security or utility asset of any member of its system or any
other public-utility company or holding company.18 8 Exemptions from the
provisions of the Act are, in general, left to the discretion of the Commission.130
If a registered holding company wishes to issue or sell its own securities or
exercise any privilege to alter the rights of those who hold such securities, the
proposal must first be submitted to the Commission for approval by means
of a declaration.140  With certain exceptions no registered holding company
may acquire any securities, utility assets, or any other interest in any business
without the approval of the Commission.141 Nor may the securities of any
public-utility company be acquired by an affiliate (or a person who would
thereby become one) who is also an affiliate of any other public-utility or hold-
ing company without such approval.1 42  Mutual service companies must make
an application for approval to the Commission and are subject to detailed regu.
lation.143  Close supervision of the internal affairs of registered holding com-
panies is provided for in sections dealing with inter-company (including loans,
and service, sales and construction contracts) and other transactions. 144
Lobbyists must file details of their retainers and monthly reports of their com-
pensation and expenses incurred.145 Officers and directors of registered holding
companies are under obligations similar to those placed upon them in the
Securities Exchange Act.140  Accounts and records must be kept in the manner
prescribed by the Commission (should that body so decide) and inspection
thereof must be allowed to the Commission and security holders.147  Periodical
and other reports may be required to keep filed information up to date and for
such other and special reasons as the Commission may see fit.148 The Com-
136. Id. subdivision (2) of subsection (a).
137. Id. subdivision (3) of subsection (a).
138. Id. subdivision (4) of subsection (a). The registration statement must contain,
among other items, full particulars concerning the applicant's organization, financial condi-
tions, important contracts, officers and directors and security-issuance history. Public Util-
ity Holding Company Act § 5, 49 STAT. 812, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79e (1935).
139. Id. § 3, 49 STAT. 810, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79c (1935).
140. Id. § 6 (a), (b), 49 STAT. 814, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79f (a), (b) (1935) [subsection (b)
sets out exemptions]. As to the contents of the declaration, see id. § 7 (a), 49 STAT. 815,
15 U. S. C. A. § 79g (a) (1935)
141. Id. § 9 (a) (1), 49 STAT. 817, 15 U. S. C. A. § 791 (a) (1) (1935).
142. Id. § 9 (a) (2), 49 STAT. 817, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79i (a) (2) (1935). For the necessary
contents of the application for approval, see id. § 10 (a), 49 STAT. 818, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79J
(a) (1935).
143. Id. § 13 (d), 49 STAT. 825, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79m (d) (1935).
144. Id. § 12,49 STAT. 825, 15 U. S. C. A. § 791 (1935); id. § 13,49 STAT. 825, 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 79m (1935).
145. Id. § 12(i), 49 STAT. 823, 15 U. S. C. A. § 791 (i) (1935).
146. Id. § 17 (a) (b), 49 STAT. 830, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79q (a), (b) (1935).
147. Id. § 15, 49 STAT. 828, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79o (1935).
148. Id. § 14, 49 STAT. 827, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79n (1935).
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mission has broad investigatory powers149 and may hold hearings in accord-
ance with such rules and regulations as it may prescribe.cO
It is impossible to view the Act as a postal statute.'r' Registration is here
more than the filing of information deemed necessary to the protection of the
investor who is frequently defrauded through use of the mails. It is essentially
submission to thoroughgoing governmental supervision. That imposition and
fraud has been visited upon investors and consumers by means of the many
objectionable practices employed by public-utility companies is too well estab-
lished to admit of doubt. But the fraud does not directly and proximately result
through use of the postal system. Rather does it flow from the nature of
the control exercised over vast accumulations of property by socially myopic
individuals. Such control may be effectuated partially through use of postal
facilities and it may be urged that the difference between this statute and ac-
cepted postal fraud legislation rests merely in a question of degree; but that
is scarcely a conclusive argument. Differences in degree are frequently en-
countered and are often of crucial importance in constitutional problems. Here
the difference must be deemed significant. The complete subjugation of an in-
dustry, no matter how desirable, cannot be predicated upon its common de-
pendence on the facilities of the postal system.
Because of the manner in which the Act is constructed none of the many
postal provisions can stand alone. On the other hand should substantial por-
tions of the Act be found valid on the basis of another power, then the postal
provisions would be sustainable as postal police regulations designed to aid
in the achievement of a constitutionally attainable aim.152
Colwlusion
It has been suggested that only the Securities Act fairly comes within the
scope of postal police power, the Securities Exchange Act and the Public Utility
Holding Company Act being far more than postal statutes. The test developed,
does the practice sought to be regulated involve the mails in a direct and proxi-
mate manner, is somewhat indefinite. A greater measure of certitude can be
achieved only through the fire-test of further judicial application. One cir-
cumstance has in the past been given great weight-if fraud or other evil
results from a particular use of the postal system and such harm could not be
effectively inflicted by other means, then, since the federal government has ex-
clusive control over the mails, the courts view denial of the use with great
149. Id. § 18, 49 STAT. 831, 15 U. S. C A. § 79r (1935).
.150. Id. § 19, 49 STAT. 832, 15 U. S. C. A. §79s (1935).
151. No discussion of the bill as a postal statute was found in the hearings held by the
Committee on Interstate Commerce of the Senate or the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce of the House. One court has decided that the Act is not a postal
statute. Burco Inc. v. Whitworth, C. C. A. 4th, Feb. 22, 1936, cert. denied, March 30, 1936.
152. See notes 48, 49, 50, .supra, and accompanying text. The postal provisions referred
to are: Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 4 (a) (2), (3), (4), (b), 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 79d (a) (2), (3), (4), (b); id. § 6 (a), (c), 15 U. S. C. A. § 79f (a), (c); id. § 8, 15
U. S. C. A. § 79h; id. § 9 (a), 15 U. S. C. A. § 791 (a); id. § 11 (g), 15 U. S. C. A. § 79k
(g); id. § 12 (a)-(h), 15 U. S. C. A. § 791 (a)-(h); id. § 13 (a), (b), (e), (f), 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 79m (a), (b), (e), (f).
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leniency. But the postal clause can not be invoked as a source of police power
wherever a business makes use of the mails. Universal dependence upon the
postal system cannot be made the basis of such an extension of congressional
power.
SUPERVENING IMPOSsIBILITY oF PERFORMANCE AS A DEFENSE.r-The ever in-
creasing tenseness in international relations, fomented by internal strife, and
aggravated by international animosities, may soon eventuate in armed con-
flict between major powers. One inevitable consequence of any such conflict,
because of the extensiveness of modern commercial intercourse, will be a serious
interference with the performance of executory contracts throughout the world.
Thus the moment is rendered propitious for the examination of an excusatory
mechanism created by the courts, through the use of which promisors are re-
lieved from the obligations of their contracts upon the plea that subsequent
events have rendered performance impossible.
The General Rule
The civil law recognized supervening impossibility of performance as a com-
plete defense to an action on contract, unless it appeared that the promisor had
assumed the risk that performance would remain possible.1 A diametrically
opposed view was adopted by the common law. Thus in Paradine v. Janea
decided in 1647, the court declared, and modern authorities reiterate,0 that
where supervening events render performance impossible, the promisor is not
excused unless the parties have so provided, notwithstanding such events were
beyond his control. The rationale underlying this principle is clear. It is
premised on the position that a contractual obligation is one voluntarily under.
taken; that the parties are free to determine the precise terms, conditions and
limitations of such obligation; that it is within the power of the promisor to
qualify his obligation; that an obligation undertaken without qualification must
be performed or damages given; and that it is the duty of the court to enforce
the contract as made by the parties.4 The principle enunciated in Paradine v.
1. 1 DOMAT, CIvir LAW (1850) 174, art. IX; 3 WLUSTON, CONTRCTS (1920) § 1979.
2. Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Reprints 897 (K. B. 1647). The case is not strictly one of
impossibility. See Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Pcrformance
(1920) 18 MIcH. L. REv. 589, 594.
3. The Harriman, 76 U. S. 161 (1869); see Lavigne v. Lavigne, 176 At. 282, 284
(N. H. 1935); Camelon-Hawn Realty Co. v. City of Albany, 207 N. Y. 377, 382, 101
N. E. 162, 163 (1913). See also 7 HAxsauRY's, LAws OF ENGLAND (2d ed. 1932) 209;
3 STEPnENs, COmmNTARiES (19th ed. 1928) 176; Woodward, Impossibility of Perlormanca
as an Excuse for Breach of Contract (1901) 1 COL. L. REv. 529.
4. The language of the reporter has become classic: ". . . where the law creates a duty
or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it without any default in him, and hath
no remedy over, there the law will excuse him . . . but when the party by his own
contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, If he may,
notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided
against it by his contract." Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 27, 82 Eng. Reprints 897, 897
(K. B. 1647).
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